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Abstract
This paper describes an algorithm of proof search for implicational formula in intu-
itionistic logic. It is based on a natural deduction style formulation of long normal
form of simply typed λ-calculus. The algorithm returns a deduction tree, which
becomes a proof if the formula is provable. When the formula is unprovable, a
counter-model is constructed by identifying the repeated nodes in the deduction
tree. Simplicity of the model construction is due to long normal form. The com-
pleteness of the algorithm is proved.
1 Introduction
The proof search is a very old subject and many algorithms are known in
standard textbooks of logic. But still, much works are being done from the
view point of Curry-Howard isomorphism and analysis of substructural logics,
e.g.,[1,8].
But intuitionistic logic is not so intuitive when we consider unprovability.
We can hardly accept the unprovability of a formula when we are shown a
failure of proof search. A Kripke counter-model can explain the unprovability
more intuitively. This “psychological gap” between syntax and semantics is,
we think, one reason why intuitionistic logic is not so widely accepted in
1 Email: hirokawa@cc.kyushu-u.ac.jp
2 Email: nagano@matu.cc.kyushu-u.ac.jp
c©2000 Published by Elsevier Science B. V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Hirokawa and Nagano
practice. The aim of the present paper is to try to ﬁll this gap. We demonstrate
that long normal form proof [4,9] is suit not only for proof search but for
counter-model generation.
Tableaux and sequent calculus with multiple conclusion are standard meth-
ods for counter-model generation [2]. Roy Dyckhoﬀ [1] formulated a contraction-
free sequent calculus LJT in which proof search does not loop. In [5], Pinto
and Roy Dyckhoﬀ used a variant of LJT and deﬁned a calculus CRIP (Calcu-
lus for Refutation of Intuitionistic Propositions) that captures unprovability.
They used LJT for proof generation and CRIP for counter-model construc-
tion. The proof obtained by LJT is not a natural deduction proof and does not
satisfy subformula property. In [1], a translation is given for LJT to natural
deduction. But further β-reductions are necessary to obtain a normal form.
The system Porgi [7] returns either a natural deduction proof or a Kripke
counter-model. It uses LJT for provability test, but it only uses the informa-
tion on the leaves of search tree. The counter-model construction in Porgi is
also based on CRIP. Thus it needs separate algorithms for proof generation
and model construction. In [3], Galmiche introduced boxed sequent and im-
proved the eﬃciency of LJT by structural sharing. The system has the ability
of proof construction and counter-model generation.
We show an algorithm, which returns a natural deduction proof or a Kripke
model depending on whether given formula is provable or not. We are inter-
ested in not only the provability of the proposition, but also the structure of
the proof and the structure of the counter-model. So, we prefer natural de-
duction system and typed lambda-terms to sequent calculus formulation. We
do not consider the eﬃciency of the algorithm. In fact, our algorithm requires
loop-checking.
Our algorithm is based on natural deduction system. At the ﬁst stage, the
algorithm searches for a proof backward and generates a tree. If the formula is
provable, then the search succeeds and the tree represents a long normal form
proof which has the formula as the type. If there is no choice of proof search
upward, or if we notice a repetition in proof search, we stop searching and
know the unprovability of the formula. The algorithm keeps track of all the
paths to tell when we fall into repetition. Until this stage, the the algorithm
works in a standard way.
Novelty is that we use long normal form proof not only for proof search
but also for counter-model construction. It simpliﬁes the construction of a
counter-model. When the search fails, we begin constructing a counter-model
following the tree from leaves to the root. The leaves have sequents of the
form Γ  A. If the proof is in long normal form, A is an atomic formula. Thus
the possible world p for the leaf Γ  A is determined simply by p |= C for all
C ∈ Γ and p |= A.
The algorithm is implemented in Lisp and is directly accessible through
an java applet at http://matu.cc.kyushu-u.ac.jp/˜nagano/works/skip/.
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2 Proof Search in Natural Deduction System
For the simplicity of the presentation, we treat only implication. Formulas are
constructed from atomic formulas P1, P2, · · · with implication “→”.
The natural deduction system of intuitionistic logic is deﬁned with the
following two inference rules [6].
B
A → B (I)
A → B A
B
(E)
The main idea of our algorithm is in proof search in a natural deduction
system. When a formula is provable, the algorithm returns a tree that repre-
sents a proof. The problem is (a) how to tell the unprovability of the formula,
i.e., how to stop searching proof and (b) how to construct a counter-model.
Given an sequent Γ  A, we search a normal form proof upward. In one
step of proof search, we try to ﬁnd sequents Δ1  B1, · · ·,Δn  Bn to which
Γ  A can be a lower sequent of an inference. When all the leaves are axiom,
the tree is a proof. Following is a case proof search succeeds. It is drawn with
(I) and (E). We can easily construct a simply typed lambda-term.
A → B
(A → B)→ A
A → B A
B
A → B
A
B
C → B
((A → B)→ A)→ (A → B)→ C → B
y : A → B
x : (A → B)→ A
y : A → B u : A
yu : B
λu.yu : A → B
x(λu.yu) : A
y(x(λu.yu)) : B
λz.y(x(λu.yu)) : C → B
λxy.λz.y(x(λu.yu)) : ((A → B)→ A)→ (A → B)→ C → B
When we cannot apply (I) or (E) any further, we stop searching. Following
is an example of such a case.
A, (A → B)→ A  (A → B)→ A
A, (A → B)→ A  B
(A → B)→ A  A → B I
(A → B)→ A  A E
 ((A → B)→ A)→ A I
We construct a counter-model to such a sequent Γ  A. The model in such
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a case has one world, so that it is a counter-model in the sense of classical
logic. We make an truth assignment to the propositional variables in Γ and
A such that all the formulas in Γ becomes true and A becomes false.
Concerning to the rule (I),the provability of the upper and lower sequents
are equivalent. So, if we have a counter-model to the upper sequent then it is
a counter-model to the lower.
When A is atomic, then we only can apply (E) rule to Γ  A. Assume
that Γ  A is not provable in such a case. For any application of (E) with
Ai1 → · · · → Aini → A ∈ Γ (i = 1, · · · ,m), some of Γ  Ai1, · · ·Γ  Aini is
unprovable. Therefore, we have a counter model Dji for Γ  Aiji for each
(i = 1, · · · ,m). Combine those possible worlds Dj1 , · · · , Djm above a new
node, then we have a counter-model to Γ  A.
Another case when we stop searching is when we notice a repetition. The
following is such a case, where Γ = A → B, (C → A) → A. When we are
searching a proof for B,C,Γ  A, it occurs as a subgoal and makes a loop in
the search path. The tree is not a proof. Roughly speaking, we identify all
the nodes in the loop to construct the counter-model.
Γ  A → B
Γ  (C → A)→ A
C,Γ  (C → A)→ A
C,Γ  A
C,Γ  C → A I
∗
C,Γ  A E
Γ  C → A I
∗
Γ  A E
Γ  B E
3 Long Normal Proof Search Algorithm
To obtain an appropriate formulation of long normal form proofs, we focus
on the occurrence of “minimum” formulas [6] in a normal form proof. An
occurrence of a formula, e.g., B, is minimum when it is the conclusion of an
E-rule and is a premise of an I-rule. When we consider a long normal form
proof, every minimum formula is atomic.
....
A → B
....
A
B
(E)
C → B (I)....
First, we use consecutive applications of I-rule and E-rule as described in
the following ﬁgure.
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A1 → · · · → An → B A1 · · ·
C1 · · ·Ck....
D
Ai = C1 → · · · → Ck → D (I
∗) · · · An
B
(E∗)
When the proof is in long normal form, B and D are atomic formulas.
Since we are considering a normal form proof, no inference appears above
A1 → · · · → An → B in (E*). Therefore A1 → · · · → An → B is in the set Γ
of assumptions. We combine (E*) and (I*) into one rule and concentrate on
the occurrences of those atomic formulas B and D. We erase the occurrence
of the assumption A1 → · · · → An → B in (E*). Thus we obtain a natural
deduction system NJβ, which corresponds to long normal form.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a formula X = A1 → A2 → · · · → An → A with
atomic A, we deﬁne H(X) = {A1, A2, · · · , An} and T (X) = A. If n = 0
H(X) = φ.
We use Greek letters Γ,Δ etc. to denote sets of formulas. Γ,Δ means the
union of Γ and Δ.
Deﬁnition 3.2 The natural deduction system NJβ is deﬁned with the fol-
lowing axiom and the inference rule.
Axiom Γ  A, if A ∈ Γ and A is atomic.
Rule
H(A1),Γ  T (A1) · · ·H(An),Γ  T (An)
Γ  A
if A1 → · · · → An → A is in Γ and A is atomic.
Theorem 3.3 For any formula X = A1 → · · · → An → A with an atomic
formula A, X is provable in intuitionistic logic iﬀ A1, · · · , An  A is provable
in NJβ.
Given a formula A, we search a proof for A. We generalize the search
as a search of proof for a sequent Γ  A. The provability of a formula A is
represented as the case where Γ is the empty set. To detect a loop in search
process, we keep track of the path ξ that have been followed. The algorithm
Search takes as input a sequent Γ  A with atomic A and a list ξ of sequent.
It returns a tree of sequents whose conclusions are atomic formulas. The leaves
of the tree have three kind of labels “axiom”, “loop” or “stop”. We call such a
tree deduction tree. If a leaf is labeled by axiom, then all the leaves are labeled
by axiom and the tree is a proof for the sequent in NJβ.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Search(Γ  A; ξ) is deﬁned as follows.
1. A ∈ Γ. Then return a node A ∈ Γ with a label “axiom”.
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2. A ∈ Γ.
2.1. Γ  A ∈ ξ. Return a node Γ  A with a label ”loop”.
2.2. Γ  A ∈ ξ.
2.2.1. Γ does not contain any Ai such that T (Ai) = A.
Return a node Γ  A with a label ”stop”.
2.2.2. Γ contains an Ai such that T (Ai) = A. Let A1, · · · , Am be all of such
formulas and Ai = B
i
1 → · · ·Bini → A (i = 1, · · · ,m). Then we have
H(Ai) = {Bi1, · · · , Bini}. By applying the algorithm recursively, we have
uij = H(B
i
j,Γ  T (Bij); Γ  A + ξ) for i = 1, · · · ,m and j = 1, · · · , ni.
2.2.2.1. For some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, all ui1, · · · , uini are proof. Return a proof
ui1 · · · uiin
Γ  A .
2.2.2.2. For each i = 1, · · · ,m, some uiji is not a proof tree (1 ≤ ji ≤ ni).
Return a tree whose root is Γ  A and has u1j1 , · · · , umjm as subtree above the
root.
Deﬁnition 3.5 If a tree contains a leaf with label “stop” or “loop”, we call
the tree fail tree.
Theorem 3.6 (Termination of Search) Given a sequent Γ  A the algo-
rithm “Search” terminates.
Proof. Since Γ is ﬁnite, there are only ﬁnite number of subformulas of for-
mulas in Γ and A. Let n be the number of such subformulas. The sequents
Δ  D that occurs in the recursive calls of “Search” consist of those subfor-
mulas. Thus the number of such sequents are ﬁnite. Therefore, beyond some
depth of recursive call of Search(Δ  D; ξ), Δ  D occurs in ξ. Hence the re-
cursive call terminates in the case 2.1 of the deﬁnition of “Search”. Therefore
the algorithm terminates. 
4 Construction of Kripke Model
Deﬁnition 4.1 A Kripke Model is a triple (D,≥, |=) such that D is an non
empty set, ≥ is a partial order on D and |= is a relation of an element in D
and a formula such that
(1) if p |= A and q ≥ p then q |= A,
(2) p |= X → Y iﬀ ∀q ≥ p(q |= X ⇒ q |= Y )
Deﬁnition 4.2 Given a model (D,≥, |=) and a node p ∈ D, the set Support(p)
of atomic formulas is deﬁned by Support(p) = {A | p |= A}. Support(D) is
the set of all atomic formulas such that q |= A for all q ∈ D.
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Deﬁnition 4.3 A single modelMS with a set of atomic formulas S = {A1, · · · , An}
is the Kripke model (D,≥, |=) such that D = {p} is a singleton set, ≥ is the
trivial order p ≥ p and |= is determined by Support(p) = S.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Given sets of models Mi = (Di,≥i, |=i)(i = 1, · · · ,m), the
joint model of Mi’s with respect to an atomic A is a model (D,≥, |=) such
that
(1) D = {p0} ∪D1 ∪ · · · ∪Dm,
(2) q ≥ p0 for all q ∈ D,
(3) Support(p) = Support(D1) ∩ · · · ∩ Support(Dm)− A.
When the deduction tree contains only the leaves labeled “stop”, we trans-
form the leaves into the singleton models. At each node, we construct the joint
model from the sub-models obtained from the sub-trees. Following is a deduc-
tion tree obtained from proof search for (A → C)→ (B → C)→ ((E → G)→
B) → (F → B) → C. Here Γ = A → B,B → C, (E → G) → B,F → B.
The counter model has the similar structure to this deduction tree.
Γ  A
E,Γ  G Γ  F
Γ  B
Γ  C
Search(Γ  A; ξ) returns a proof or deduction
tree. When it is not a proof, the leaves are la-
beled by stop or loop. We construct a Kripke
model from such a tree. When a leaf has a se-
quent Σ  B and is labeled by loop, then the
tree contains another node N3 below the leaf
with the same sequent Σ  B. We identify all
the nodes between the leaf and the node along
the path. We start at a leaf N1 labeled “loop”
and go down the tree until N3. We identify
those nodes along the path. Similarly we iden-
tify the nodes between N2 and N4. For exam-
ple, in the node N5, we have to remember that
we are identifying the nodes with the sequents
Σ  B and Δ  C. To trace those repetition of
the sequents, we bring the set of such sequents.
If Γ  A is not provable, Search(Γ  A) returns a deduction tree. Given
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such a deduction tree t, the following algorithm generates a model tm as well
as the set tlof sequents to trace repetition.
Remember that H(A1 → · · · → An → A) = {A1, · · · , An} and T (A1 →
· · · → An → A) = A for atomic A.
Deﬁnition 4.5 tm and tl
1. t is a leaf labeled “loop” with Γ  A.
Then tm is the singleton model with T (Γ)− A and tl is {Γ  A}. Here, we
denote T (Γ) = {T (B) | B ∈ Γ}.
2. t is a leaf labeled “stop” with Γ  A.
Then tm is the singleton model with T (Γ) and tl is the empty set.
3. t has the root with subtrees t1, · · · , tn.
3.1. Γ  A does not occur in any tli.
Then tm is the joint model of tm1 , · · · , tmn wrt A and tl = tl1 ∪ · · · ∪ tln.
3.2. Γ  A occurs in some tli.
Then construct the the joint model M of tm1 , · · · , tmn wrt A. tm is obtained
from M by identifying the root and all the root of submodels tmi such that
Γ  A occurs in tli. tl = tl1 ∪ · · · ∪ tln − {Γ  A}.
5 Correctness of Algorithm
We shall prove the correctness of the algorithm,i.e., we shall prove that tm =
Search(Γ  A;nil) is a counter-model for Γ  A. The model is constructed
by traversing the nodes of the tree t. So, there is a correspondence from nodes
Δ  D in the deduction tree t to a node p in the Kripke model tm. The nodes
in the deduction tree and the node in the Kripke model is said to be adjoint
to each other. We prove the correctness of the algorithm using this adjoint
correspondence.
Remark 5.1 If Search(Γ  B; ξ) is a deduction tree, then no sequent Δ  C
in the tree is provable.
Remark 5.2 If a sequent Δ  B occurs in a deduction tree t = Search(Γ 
A;nil). Then the subtree with the root Δ  B is identical to the deduction
tree Search(Δ  B; ξ) where ξ is the path from Γ  A to Δ  B in t.
Lemma 5.3 Let t = Search(Π  A; ξ), p be a node in the Kripke model tm
and Γ  B be a sequent in t which adjoints to p. Then the following (1) and
(2) hold.
(1) p |= X for all X ∈ Γ.
(2) p |= B.
Proof. (2) is clear from the deﬁnition of tm.
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Let Γ  D be the lowest occurrence of the sequents in t that adjoints to
p and let t0 be the subtree of t whose root is the occurrence of Γ  D. We
prove (1) by induction on the length |X| of the formula X and the depth of
the submodel determined by the node p. Here, the length |X| of a formula X
is deﬁned by |X| = 1 if X is atomic and |(X1 → X2)| = |X1|+ |X2|.
1. X is atomic.
If Δ  X occurred in t∗. Then we have X ∈ Δ since X ∈ Γ ⊆ Δ. This
contradicts Δ  X of Remark 5.1. Therefore, t∗ does not contain a sequent
of the form Δ  X. Hence p |= X by deﬁnition of tm.
2. X is not atomic.
Then we have X = X1 → X2 → · · · → Xn → C for some atomic formula C
and n ≥ 1.
2.1. tm does not contain a sequent of the form Δ  C.
By deﬁnition of tm, p |= C. Thus we have p |= X = X1 → X2 → · · · →
Xn → C.
2.2. tm contains a sequent of the form Δ  C.
Let Δ  C be the lowest occurrence of such sequents.
2.2.1. Δ  C does not adjoint to p.
Consider a node q in the model tm that adjoints to Δ  C. Since Δ  C
occurs above Γ  B in the deduction tree, q occurs above p. Since Δ  C
does not adjoint to p, it follows that q > p. We prove p |= X1 → X2 →
· · · → Xn → C by showing p′ |= C assuming p′ |= X1, · · · , p′ |= Xn for an
arbitrary p′ ≥ p.
2.2.1.1. p′ = p.
By assumption we have p |= X1, · · · , p |= Xn. By induction hypothesis for
q we have q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xn. Therefore we have q |= C. On the other
hand, we have q |= C by induction hypothesis for q > p. A contradiction.
Thus it does not happen that q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xn.
2.2.1.2. p′ > p.
Consider an occurrence of a sequent Σ  E that adjoints to p′. By induc-
tion hypothesis for p′, we have p′ |= X1 → X2 → · · · → Xn → C. By
assumption, we have p′ |= X1, · · · , p′ |= Xn. Thus we have p′ |= C.
2.2.2. Δ  C adjoints to p.
Then we have Δ = Γ. Since X1 → X2 → · · · → Xn → C ∈ Δ, an inference
is applicable to this node. Therefore this node is not labeled “stop”. Since
we chose Δ  C as the lowest occurrence, no sequent of the form Δ  C
does not occur below the node. Therefore no node is labeled with “loop”
below this node. Thus this node has a child Γ  Xi which is not provable.
Moreover, the deduction tree with the root Γ  C has a deduction tree t1
whose root is H(Xi),Γ  T (Xi).
2.2.2.1. Xi is atomic.
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Then H(Xi) is empty and T (Xi) = Xi. To prove p |= X1 → · · · → Xn → C,
it suﬃces to show q |= C assuming q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xn for any q ≥ p.
2.2.2.1.1. q = p.
In t1 we have p |= Xi. This contradicts the assumption q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xn.
Thus this case does not happen.
2.2.2.1.2. q > p.
By the deﬁnition of tm, a sequent Sigma  E which adjoints to q occurs
properly above Δ  C. Since X1 → · · · → Xn → C ∈ Δ ⊂ Σ, we can
apply induction hypothesis for Σ  E. Thus we have q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xn.
Therefore q |= C.
2.2.2.2. X is not atomic.
Similar to 2.2.2.1.
2.2.2.2.1. q = p.
Let Xi = X
1
i → · · ·Xmi → X0i . Since |X1i |, · · · , |Xmi | < |Xi| < |X|, we have
p′ |= X1i , · · · , p′ |= Xmi by induction hypothesis for t1. On the other hand,
we have p′ |= X0i and p ≤ p′. It follows p |= X1i → · · ·Xmi → X0i , i.e.,
p |= Xi. This contradicts the assumption q |= X1, · · · , q |= Xm.
2.2.2.2.2. q ≥ p.
Similar to 2.2.2.1.2.

Theorem 5.4 Let A be a formula which is not provable in intuitionistic logic,
t = Search( A;nil) and M = tm. If A is unprovable in intuitionistic logic,
then M is a counter-model for A, i.e., M |= A.
Proof. Let A = A1 → · · ·An → B with atomic B and Γ = {A1, · · · , An}.
Apply Lemma5.3 to the root of M and to the sequent Γ  B. Then Theorem
follows. 
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